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2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will focus primarily on fraud, error, and corruption in the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England and Wales but, where useful, will make reference to international 
literature as well. It will offer a definition of fraud, but also highlight the fact that fraud and 
corruption are often used interchangeably to define the same act, which adds confusion to the 
complex matter of providing a clear definition of fraud. Once the definition has been clarified, 
there will be a review of the structure of the NHS and how it tackles fraud. This is followed 
by how we can measure fraud, and the estimated extent of fraud in the NHS. Finally, we 
review the contribution of criminology in developing theoretical frameworks to help us 
understand why people commit fraud and how to prevent it.  
 
2.1.1 What Is fraud?  
 
In this book we have defined fraud as “illegally obtaining a benefit of any nature by 
intentionally breaking1 a rule”.2 Based on deception, fraud is an intentional act to secure a 
mainly financial advantage – in the present or future – with, but usually without, the 
knowledge of those victimized. However, the Fraud Act 2006 (for England and Wales and 
Northern Ireland) has defined three types of fraud, namely fraud by false representation under 
Section 2, fraud by failing to disclose information under Section 3, and fraud by abuse of 
position under Section 4 of the act.3 England, Wales and Northern Ireland are thus unique in 
codifying the offence of fraud with the passage of the Fraud Act 2006. Under this definition, a 
failure to disclose is also considered fraud, indicating that both active and passive behaviour is 
unacceptable.  
Clear standards are useful to combat fraud, but even if this were the case within the 
European Union, the law would be applied differently, depending on the resources available 
and political will. This, however, is only the start of the problem. What is the difference 
between an act of fraud and one of abuse? The clearest definition is that of stretching rather 
than breaking the rule(s) or guideline(s), or taking advantage of an absence of rules or 
guidelines in an unjust fashion. Errors, by contrast, are qualitatively different as these are 
where there is an unintentional breaking of a rule or guideline. For example, errors could be 
where a patient is made a payment by mistake or “extra” treatment is provided beyond what is 
covered or allowed under insurance. 
                                                          
1 Emphasis added.  
2 EHFCN, Waste Typology, https://ehfcn-powerhouse.org/groups/4-ehfcn-waste-typology-matrix/welcome 
(accessed 24 March, 2015). 
3 Home Office, Fraud Act 2006, Chapter 35, HMSO, London, 2006. 
All of this is complicated by corruption; those that work under the disciplines of 
political science and economics tend to focus on corruption.4 Innumerable definitions of 
corruption are available5 with most emphasizing the public sector as a cause of or conduit for 
corruption. This view, however, would be to underestimate the private sector and its penchant 
for corruption. Fraud is often defined as, stated by the anti-fraud organization Transparency 
International,6 the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This definition is not a simple 
definition of public sector corruption, even though it is often used as one. Corruption is also a 
term of appraisal and one that is negative. It has a range of meanings; specialized, technical 
and professional meanings but also a public social meaning and understanding of what is 
corrupt. This has produced a consistent feature in the corruption literature, but there is no 
conclusive definition of the term. A working definition is, however, useful and we will use 
“illegally obtaining a benefit […] by abuse of power with third party involvement”.7 It is 
always possible to abuse power in a manner that is not necessarily illegal, however.  
Any definition can have two elements;8 it can articulate the import and usage of a 
word and also act as a tool to help construct an explanation; the social sciences are primarily 
concerned with the latter. Understood as a tool, a definition aims to identify a set of criteria 
that suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon to occur. These criteria, 
however, differ depending on the focus of the discipline; it is therefore useful, perhaps, to 
place corruption, and all the illegal and legal but immoral acts that it can include, onto a 
continuum to highlight how different theoretical approaches emphasize different aspects of 
corruption and ways of preventing them.9  
This chapter will, however, primarily focus on how to measure fraud and the 
contribution of criminology to understanding and preventing healthcare fraud. However, 
because fraud covers some aspects of corruption, when a reference is made to fraud in this 
chapter, it will also cover some aspects of corruption. It is important to note, nevertheless, that 
measuring corruption necessitates different methodological approaches and poses challenges 
that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.2 
 
2.2.1 NHS Counter Fraud Structure 
 
The NHS is an organization that is in a state of change; recently the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 expanded the role of the private sector in health services. We now have a 
competitive market which the state pays for (only in England) via Clinical Commissioning 
                                                          
4 P.M. Heywood (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption, Routledge, Abingdon, 2015, pp. 1-13. 
5 Ibid., pp. 137-154. 
6 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2012, London, Transparency International, Berlin, 
2012. 
7 EHFCN 2015, see n. 2. 
8 M. Philp, ‘The Definition of Political Corruption’, in Heywood 2015, see n. 4, pp. 17-29. 
9 G. Brooks, D. Walsh, C. Lewis & H. Kim, The Prevention of Corruption: Investigation, Enforcement and 
Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013, pp. 119-121.  
Groups (CCGs). These are subject to competition law and buy in services from the public and 
private sector but still work under NHS logo.  
Those working in counter fraud in the NHS are charged with preventing and detecting 
fraud, bribery and corruption. However, the NHS in the United Kingdom is a complex 
structure, and as such this chapter will confine itself to counter-fraud provisions within 
England. As of October, 2015, there are counter fraud specialists within the Department of 
Health, NHS Protect and Local Counter Fraud Specialists. These specialists are either 
employed directly by the NHS or under contract, working in local NHS Trusts10 and/or other 
health-orientated providers that deliver services on behalf of the NHS and that require some 
form of counter-fraud specialism.  
 
2.2.2 Anti-Fraud Unit: NHS Protect 
 
The Department of Health delivers a range of critical services to NHS organizations. 
However, it is the NHS Business Services Authority that oversees the work of NHS Protect – 
the role of which is to prevent crime(s) and protect NHS resources. The Department of Health 
also has its own tactical fraud unit, known as the Department of Health Anti-Fraud Unit (DH 
AFU) and aims to offer support to and empower employees to expose fraud in the NHS. This 
could perhaps best be described as a campaign to tackle the way concerned employees in the 
NHS have been treated by their employers11, 12 when they have tried to expose poor standards 
of care and fraud. 
However, it is a step in the right direction, providing support to employees and 
encouraging people to report suspicions of potential and/or known cases of fraud. A dedicated 
anti-fraud unit therefore has been created within the Department of Health. The terms of 
reference for the unit include “raising awareness of types of fraud, and encouraging 
employees to expose fraud and financial impropriety”. The DHAFU is also responsible for 
preventing fraud and coordinating counter-fraud activities throughout the “entire health 
family”13 with the remit of conducting investigations into “national, large or complex cases”14 
that NHS Protect cannot realistically be expected to take on.  
NHS Protect was established in April 2011, and replaced the NHS Security 
Management Service (NHSMS), the previous body that was charged with preventing and 
reducing fraud. The remit of NHS Protect is to take national responsibility for protecting NHS 
employees and its resources from crime. Little appears to have changed so far, but NHS 
Protect should focus on protecting NHS resources from crime by protecting “health and care 
employees and resources from actions that otherwise undermine their effectiveness and ability 
to meet the needs of patients and professionals”.15 As such, this body is tasked with 
preventing fraud, but also other types of corruption. It claims to have adopted an intelligence-
                                                          
10 A Trust is an organization that provides services in a geographical area in England. 
11 M. Barrow, ‘2000 Nurses Warned to Keep Quiet about risks to Patient’s Lives’, The Times, Tuesday, April 23, 
2013, p. 18.  
12 C. Smyth, ‘NHS Boss Tells Gagged Staff They Can Speak Out’, The Times, Tuesday, March 19, 2013, p. 11. 
13 NHS Protect, Annual Report 2014-15, NHS, London, 2015, pp. 11-14.  
14 Ibid. 
15 NHS Protect, NHS Protect Business Plan 2015-16, NHS, London, 2015, p. 7. 
led approach that underpins “prevention, disruption and enforcement”16 and works in 
collaboration with the Department of Health Anti-Fraud Unit and Local Counter Fraud 
Specialists (LCFS) employed by NHS Trusts, and where possible with other organizations 
contracted to perform NHS functions. 
At the local level there is a legal requirement for each health body to appoint a person 
or person(s) to carry out a range of counter-fraud work – prevention, deterrence and 
investigation. This requirement is determined by the terms of service within the NHS 
Standard Contract which applies to all healthcare providers. This service condition requires 
providers to implement satisfactory measures to address all counter-fraud issues. Initially, 
providers are required to produce “an organization crime profile using a toolkit provided by 
NHS Protect”, and once this is completed, to “take the necessary action to meet the standards 
set by NHS Protect at the level indicated by the organizational crime profile.”17 
Depending upon the responses provided, an organizational category of one to three is 
allocated. Category one for example is where an organization is deemed to have “high value 
NHS contracts, a high number of employees, high value NHS assets and large numbers of 
patient interactions”. Furthermore, Strategic Governance Standard 1.3 requires an 
organization to employ or contract in: 
 
an accredited person (or persons) to undertake full range of anti-fraud, bribery and corruption 
work, including proactive work to prevent and deter fraud, bribery and corruption and reactive 
work to hold those who commit fraud bribery and corruption to account.18  
 
Those providing counter-fraud expertise are required to perform to a satisfactory professional 
standard and, accordingly, should “attend specialist training that has been accredited by the 
Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board”19 where necessary.  
The number of LCFS required by each organization is determined by the level of risk 
which is calculated from the crime profile. Health services have some flexibility in how they 
deal with this risk, but must adhere to expected standards sets by NHS Protect. Some health 
services employ LCFS directly, whilst some share the same LCFS, and others buy time from 
organizations that offer fraud and security solutions. However, with the changing structure of 
the NHS, it is still unclear which powers of investigation LCFS and NHS Protect will have in 
the future.  
 
2.3 
 
2.3.1 Measurement of Fraud in Healthcare  
 
As a discipline, criminology has a history of debating the usefulness and limitations of crime 
data and the problematic nature of recording and measuring crime. The literature20 explains 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 NHS England, NHS Standard Contract 2015/16 Service Conditions, NHS, London, 2015. 
18 NHS Protect, Standards for Providers 2015-16: Fraud, Bribery and Corruption, NHS, London, 2015, p. 13. 
19 Ibid., p. 26. 
20 C. Coleman & J. Moynihan, Understanding Crime Data, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1996.  
how crime is recorded and also why crime statistics substantially under-record crime. 
Regardless of the nature of the criminal justice system – adversarial or prosecutorial – similar 
issues arise; lack of confidence in the police, no insurance, crime committed whilst 
victimized, items stolen of little personal value, and so on. However, if we consider these data 
for what they are and are aware of their limitations, they serve a purpose and are of use. For 
all its limitations, recorded crime is an antidote to wildly inaccurate views of crime21 and 
reveals how the police work (i.e. different rates of cautions, in relation to whom, in different 
locations) and offers an insight into how those from poor backgrounds are arrested and 
convicted, perhaps indicating a bias in policing and criminal justice bodies. Furthermore, 
there are problems with recording “hidden crimes” such as domestic violence and child abuse. 
Fraud, although different in that it is predominantly, but not always a non-violent crime, is 
similar in that it is “hidden”. It is therefore difficult to assess the amount of fraud that exists 
and the number of victims.  
However, there have been and continue to be many attempts to measure fraud and 
error22 and corruption,23 and criticism of them. As with all crime data, it is useful to reflect on 
whether the measurement of fraud and acts of criminal corruption – those that contravene 
criminal law rather than civil law – is worthwhile. We would suggest that it is more than 
worthwhile; it is necessary. Whilst all crime data can be flawed, this is no reason to abandon 
the exercise. As the points above indicate, crime data are still useful even if they are 
incomplete. Any policy or strategy will need to be based on some indication of the size of the 
problem to put in place a system of prevention, and as such the measurement of fraud and the 
development of more sophisticated approaches can increase our knowledge of the problem 
and, in turn, the level of victimization. This is particularly important for all crime but as we 
attempt to continue to deliver high-quality healthcare to expanding populations, funds lost to 
fraud adversely affect our ability to safeguard the most vulnerable in need of healthcare.  
 
2.3.2 Detection of Fraud – the Fraud Loss Measurement Method  
 
One method of detecting fraud which has made some headway is the process of Fraud Loss 
Measurement (FLM).24 As an exercise, it involves the assessment of a statistically valid 
sample of transactions within a specific population such as procurement or payroll. The 
sample is used to determine whether these transactions are correct, have been made in error, 
or acts of fraud. Clear standards are set to define fraud and error that draw on the civil 
definition of fraud, so there are different FLM exercises in different settings – i.e. health, 
welfare, international aid – are held to the same standard and in different contexts – i.e. 
purchasing of products, services and/or buildings.  
                                                          
21 S. Jones, Criminology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 31-52.  
22 M. Levi & J. Burrows, ‘Measuring the Impact of Fraud in the UK: A Conceptual and Empirical Journey’, 
British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2008, pp. 293-319.  
23 Brooks et al., 2013, see n. 9, pp. 27-42. 
24 J. Gee, M. Button & G. Brooks The Financial Cost of Healthcare Fraud. What the Data From around the 
World Shows, London, PKF/CCFS, 2011. M. Button, C. Lewis, D. Shepard & G. Brooks, ‘Fraud in Overseas 
Aid and the Problem of Measurement’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, pp. 184-198.  
FLM is based on the principle that in a given number of transactions, a few cases of 
fraud will be detected, there will also be some cases of undetected fraud and a high number of 
correct transactions. It is perhaps the undetected cases of fraud that cause most trouble; 
providing evidence of undetected fraud is difficult, and if in fact it is fraud, the scale of fraud 
and the potential offenders increase the complexity of this problem, depending on the position 
they hold in the organization, and/or whether they are still part of the organization, have 
moved abroad, and/or died if the fraud was committed years ago. Such questions, and the 
capacity of the organization to seek financial redress, make the measurement of fraud a 
difficult task. If we are unable or unwilling to enforce civil or criminal laws, reclaim lost 
funds and punish offenders, the question arises: “why would we measure fraud?”  
FLM has largely been used in sizeable public sector organizations that deal with social 
security payments, taxation, and payment to contractors for services and also insurance fraud 
in the private sector. FLM exercises are used in different jurisdictions. These investigations go 
beyond a normal assessment and there is also an expectation of recovering losses from the 
payments made in fraud and error (in the USA, this is known as Payment Recapture Audits or 
Recovery Audits). In the United Kingdom, FLM exercises are used regularly by the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (responsible for social security payments), Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (responsible for collecting taxes) and the NHS. The DWP 
invests a significant amount of time in the investigation and prevention25 of fraud but also in 
measuring losses to fraud. The NHS has also made use of FLM in the past for a number of 
areas of expenditure; these have included patient prescription payments, patient optical fraud, 
and procurement fraud. A number of research exercises have examined losses across 
healthcare where fraud loss measurement has been applied. In the latest overview of such 
exercises,26 the average loss between 1997 and 2013 in health care was 6.19%, ranging from 
0.60% to 15.40%. Of these reviews, 57.7% showed losses between 3% and 8%, 30.8% over 
8% and 11.5% below 3%.  
They are, therefore, more than an academic exercise to gauge the size of the problem. 
From these assessments, it is possible to estimate the extent of fraud and error to a statistical 
level of confidence and tolerance range. This is usually presented as a fraud frequency rate 
(FFR), which is the number of transactions which are fraudulent and/or made in error and the 
fraud loss rate (FLR), which is the monetary value of losses.  
 
2.3.2.1 Criticisms of the FLM  
There are, however, some issues which need to be considered. First of all, substantial sample 
sizes are needed for an accurate assessment. For many organizations, regardless of the sector, 
the better the assessment and levels of accuracy, the better they can plan, initiate policy and 
design and implement a strategy to reduce fraud and errors. However, this means that the 
sample size has to be at least around 1000 to obtain an accurate representation of the actual 
level of fraud and error. This involves detailed investigation, and is a labour-intensive 
process, particularly if all the information required is not readily available. This means it can 
                                                          
25 Department of Work and Pensions, ‘Fraud and Error in the Benefit System: Preliminary 2013/14 Estimates’, 
London, DWP, 2011, pp. 8-35. 
26 Gee & Button, 2011, see n. 24, pp. 1-15. 
be an expensive exercise costing anything from GBP 30,000 to GBP 100,000 per FLM, 
depending on the sample size and the ease with which it can be conducted.27 For many 
organizations – particularly those who sense (perhaps rightly so) that they have low levels of 
fraud, spending such amounts, only to be informed that the fraud level is low, has little 
appeal. Linked to the cost is the potentially disruptive impact on the organizations, including 
on the morale of the ethical majority of employees, especially as each sample transaction is 
investigated as if it were a fraud.  
An added issue to consider is that of automation and efficiency: to make the FLM 
process less disruptive and secure the best results, it is suited to organizations where records 
are orderly, coherent, perhaps online, and accessible (i.e. can someone from outside an 
organization make sense of the system and recording of data?). FLM exercises that involve 
paper trails are not impossible, but add to the cost, as will an unnecessary complex system of 
recording data; complex systems also add to the potential for both fraud and error to occur.  
 
2.3.3 Fraud Loss Measurement Limitations 
 
FLM exercises, as stated, are suited to substantial numbers of similar transactions within a 
specified population; they are not suited to assessing the total fraud in an organization or 
sector unless they are broken down into small chunks of similar transactions. An FLM 
exercise is of use, then, if there are sufficient numbers that focus on a type of payment in a 
specific sector. Furthermore, when fraud and error are combined into a single “improper 
payments” category, it is impossible to establish the level of fraud, rendering the whole 
process less useful if it is being done in order to measure fraud. Whilst fraud and error can 
both be counted as a “loss” to an organization, the solutions to these problems are very 
different. 
It is clear, however, that fraud remains a significant problem in healthcare systems 
around the world and one which implies a higher cost than previously estimated. Where 
organizations have undertaken repeated exercises to measure their losses in the same areas of 
expenditure, evidence suggests that this has helped to reduce fraud.28 In the United Kingdom, 
however, the NHS has moved away from FLM exercises and a programme of measuring the 
cost of fraud (and error); between 1998 and 2006 there were fifteen loss measurement 
exercises, with six exercises in 2007–2008, but there were only two such exercises between 
2009 and 2014.  
Fraud within the healthcare system can be committed by patients, pharmacists, 
healthcare practitioners (such as dentists, opticians, doctors and hospital consultants), NHS 
employees, external contractors, and overseas visitors, known as “health tourists” who exploit 
the free healthcare offered by the NHS. This, however, is a problem for all healthcare 
systems, not only the NHS. Some of these cases of fraud can be broken down into specific 
typologies, including procurement fraud, payroll expenditure fraud and expenses fraud. These 
frauds also range from high-volume, low-value fraud such as prescription fraud to what is 
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considered high-value, low-volume such as the procurement of medicines or the falsification 
of patient records by doctors.  
Furthermore, whilst definitions of corruption are available, with most emphasizing the 
public sector as a cause or conduit of crime, social sciences have for many years been trying 
to identify and explain a range of behaviours at the individual, organizational and state level 
that are considered corrupt. This is exacerbated by trying to explain acts which are motivated 
social actions – whether they are rational, calculated and/or temporary deviations from 
“normal behaviour”. Fraud and corruption are therefore placed into a context in which people 
interact. The majority of the academic literature is still marked by a Western assumption 
about the need for free markets and liberal constitutional orders. However, there are 
significant differences within states – democratic, autocratic, and across sectors – health, 
finance – because of transnational and cross-border fraud and corruption. In addition, fraud as 
an aspect of corruption is still seen, even by major organizations such as the IMF and World 
Bank, as a public sector issue.29  
This is incorrect. With the increase in the privatization of public services, the 
distinction between the public and private spheres of influence and power is becoming more 
blurred. The private sector can commit fraud without any contact with the public sector and is 
hidden until egregious acts are exposed and civil and criminal law is invoked. This emphasis 
on the public sector means that we miss real instances of fraud and corruption and focus 
predominantly on the public sector.  
 
2.3.4 Fraud as a Multi-Faceted and Global Phenomenon  
 
The problems encountered when trying to construct a consistent and unambiguous definition 
of fraud and corruption exhibit that many factors undermine attempts to arrive at a definitive 
version, particularly when studying the issue from an EU perspective, let alone a global 
perspective. As a result an unequivocal definition of fraud and corruption remains elusive and 
also provides challenges in terms of strategies for prevention and enforcement. Fraudulent 
acts should therefore be viewed as a complex and multifaceted phenomena with a multiplicity 
of causes and effects, as they exhibit many different forms and functions in very diverse 
contexts, ranging from either a single act that transgresses the law to a way of life for an 
individual, group of people, and/or societal order, which is may be deemed morally 
acceptable.  
Exactly what counts as fraud and corruption is relative, but our understanding of this is 
rooted in a social, political and cultural context. Corruption is a product of its environment, 
history and social development. We therefore fall into a trap whereby we try to define 
corruption as a technical problem that can be dealt with by changing processes – this view of 
people is a predominantly economic one, where incentives to act corruptly must be removed, 
and popular understandings of corruption which are often wide-ranging and diverse. This, 
however, tells us little about the reality of living with fraud and corruption and the damage 
that it can and does do people that have services withdrawn due to lack of funds, lack of 
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access to medicines, unwanted and unnecessary operation(s), and the effect this has on those 
close to the victims.  
Fraud is also viewed, depending on the factors mentioned above, as an illustration of 
moral decay. However, focusing on morality alone is also flawed since it does little to assist 
those in the social sciences to explain such acts with a focus instead on behavioural indicators 
and their potential manifestations. What is needed is a clearer understanding of what 
motivates people to commit fraud and act in a purely self-interested way, particularly if we 
expect people to change the way they behave. It is here that sociology and criminology have 
much to offer beyond the discourses of political science and economic theory.  
However, whilst it is necessary to consider the measurement of fraud particularly for 
politicians and civil and policy administrators to fund counter fraud specialists and law 
enforcement to tackle and reduce the level of “known” fraud in healthcare systems, 
understanding why rather than simply how or how much fraud is committed is also important 
if we wish to prevent substantial losses to healthcare services in the European Union. In the 
next section, we will consider why fraud is committed. 
 
2.4 
 
2.4.1 Fraud and Corruption in Healthcare: A Contribution from Criminology  
 
Sociology and criminology focus on the broad range of human relationships and institutions. 
These are briefly reviewed here in the clearest chronological order possible but as with all 
theoretical approaches they are criticized, revised and built upon. Often dismissed as “empty 
ruminations”, theoretical thoughts have future consequences for how we treat, punish and 
deter offenders.30 A brief scan of criminal justice policy illustrates that theoretical approaches 
affect which laws and techniques are implemented and therefore theoretical approaches are a 
core element of preventing crime. This is where the usefulness of sociology and criminology 
comes into play. They both have a history of explaining deviance, the breaking of rules and 
moral codes and also criminal acts.  
It was originally the notion of white-collar crime, committed by the “powerful” and 
members of the upper socio-economic class, that stimulated an interest in sociology and 
criminology as to why people in such positions would commit such crime(s). Sutherland was 
convinced that the criminal law did not cover all forms of white-collar crime because most of 
the harmful activities by white-collar criminals are settled outside the criminal court by civil 
law procedures or disciplinary rules, as many still are. Given that the crimes of powerful 
businessmen and women often go undetected, and if detected may not be prosecuted, and if 
prosecuted they may not be convicted, the amount of criminally convictions for white-collar 
crime is far below the real population of white collar criminals.31 
Sutherland suggests that there are nine key tenets that explain why people in white-
collar position commit crimes; whilst it is not possible to review all of them here, the key 
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elements of this approach are that criminality is learned through interaction with others in a 
process of communication – known as differential association.  
This process of communication is learned by observing what are referred to as 
definitions favourable to violation of law(s). This process includes the techniques, motives, 
drives, rationalizations and attitudes towards set criminal actions. For a person to commit 
criminal acts there needs to be a culture of dominant attitudes that justify and rationalize such 
acts as an acceptable way to behave. This approach departs radically from the notion that 
criminals are pathological, and driven to crime by a range of internal struggles that can fall 
under the umbrella of “cognitively defective constitutions”. It was assumed that when crimes 
were committed, and this was by mostly “poor people”, this was due to psychopathic or 
sociopathic conditions. The problem with this approach, however, was how to explain that 
people in white-collar positions could commit criminal acts and yet continue to function. This 
is explained by developing a positive self-concept that was a combination of 
institutionalization, rationalization and socialization. In one proposed model32, the 
combination of these elements are that institutionalization is where an initial act becomes 
embedded in structures and processes and thereby rationalized through a self-serving 
justification for committing a criminal act; socialization is the process whereby new 
employees are induced or seduced into the view that corruption is permissible. In this sense, 
young doctors may potentially be corrupted by older ones in the healthcare sector. This 
approach, however, fails to explain the origins of criminal behaviour; if the behaviour/acts did 
not previously exist, how could they be learned?  
 
2.4.2. Fraud and How It Relates to (a Lack of) Opportunities for Success 
 
The notion of strain describes a lack of legitimate opportunities for “success” and the pursuit 
of wealth, meaning that for those unable to attain this “expected” aim an illegitimate route to 
success potentially is tempting.33 This explanation, however, focuses primarily on street crime 
and is based on the views of Durkheim that people experience anomic thoughts in times of 
social and economic turmoil. While human needs such as food and shelter remain a static part 
of the human condition, sudden changes in the social structure lead to a decline in social 
regulation and hence social unrest. For Merton, however, a lack of legitimate opportunity for 
“success” in America, remains a permanent part of society rather than any sudden change to 
the social and economic context. A common criticism of “strain” is that there is an 
assumption that there is a consensus in America, or indeed in any capitalist society, regarding 
the pursuit of the increasing wealth and how people interact with one another to establish 
meaning and understand the context of life. It fails to recognize pluralism, ethnic and 
otherwise, and is therefore too broad a description of cultural attitudes in a society. Limited in 
its original form in explaining white-collar crimes, this theoretical approach helps explain 
how affluent people might engage in criminal acts.34 These approaches may contribute to the 
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debate on healthcare fraud; some level of strain is experienced by most, if not all of us at 
some time in life, regardless of our social position and status. Highly trained and educated 
doctors and pharmacists, for example, might engage in fraud as they assess their success, or 
lack of it, in terms of the position they hold in an organization. If they are turned down for a 
promotion that they think they should have received, this could become a justification for 
fraud – abusing the system in which they work.  
 
2.5 
 
2.5.1 Techniques of Neutralization 
 
However, how can those working in healthcare commit crimes and still deliver the service(s) 
expected of them? Sykes and Matza explain that part of the process of learning social norms 
consists of learning excuses, or what are called “techniques of neutralization”.35 They focused 
on those that were accessible – young people and street crimes – rather than acts of fraud. 
This approach, however, has some resonance and value as it can explain that individuals and 
crowds of people can temporarily suspend or neutralize their commitment to expected 
behaviour and laws. There are five “techniques” but a few should suffice here. There is the 
denial of injury, which is where offenders insist their actions did not cause any harm or 
damage i.e. nobody was put in physical danger. For example, a doctor might claim for 
allowances which they are not entitled to such as putting in a claim for home visit to patients, 
particular out-of-hours activities that did not occur, refuse patients appointments at their place 
of work (doctors’ surgery) to claim expenses for home visits that were unnecessary, add non-
existent “ghost patients” to the doctor’s register to obtain additional reimbursement from the 
NHS, keep deceased patients names on the register and continue to claim reimbursement for 
ongoing healthcare. This leads on to “passing the blame” or disbursement of blame, whereby 
a company, or co-accused is caught committing an illegal act – be it breaking the internal 
rules of a company or breaking the law but claiming that the company was well aware of the 
acts, and either actively encouraged such behaviour or failing to stop it. These techniques 
should not be seen in isolation; they can and do combine to create a “wall of justification”, 
particularly if perpetrators are caught, in order to diminish the impact and seriousness of the 
offence committed. Supporting these techniques of neutralization is the work of Dittenhofer36 
and Zeiltin, and the syndrome of injustice and dissatisfaction. Behaviour in this category is 
justified as a sense of injustice felt vis-à-vis an employer. As Coleman37 pointed out, 
neutralization techniques are not only post hoc rationalizations of white-collar crime, but can 
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93, No. 2, 1987, pp. 406-439. J.W. Coleman, ‘Motivation and Opportunity: Understanding the Causes of White 
Collar Crime’, in G. Geis, R Meier & L. Salinger (eds.), White Collar Crime (3rd edition), Free Press, New 
York, 1995, pp. 360-381.  
also precede the rule breaking and thereby morally facilitate non-compliance. A 
rationalization is not an after-the-fact excuse that a perpetrator uses to justify his or her 
behaviour, but an integral part of the actor’s motivation for the act. However, then as now, 
these techniques fail to offer a proper explanation for violent behaviour and those individuals 
and/or organizations that commit serious offences, and the role that resistance plays in 
committing fraud and exercising choice is limited. 
 
2.5.2 Social Control  
 
This leads us on to the notion of control, and why is it that people conform rather than commit 
crime. The theoretical approaches that fall under the umbrella of control theory suggest that 
crime and delinquency is to be expected unless sociocultural controls – family, teachers, and 
police – operate effectively to prevent crime.38 The theoretical approaches that follow 
emphasize weak social control or bonds between people, ideals, and society. Most focus on 
the family and youth delinquency and view the family as the primary source of socialization. 
Delinquency and crime is explained as the lack of internalized control or a “moral compass”. 
The problem here is that rationality is assumed; there is no scope for enquiring how people 
make sense of the world which they inhabit. There is also the possibility that delinquency 
leads to a weakening of social bonds rather than weak bonds leads to delinquency. 
Furthermore, these approaches assume that “decent parents” should be trying to teach middle 
class values (however, these are defined) to children. However, even for Hirschi, morals are 
variable rather than fixed and immutable, and as such keeping “poor company” can have an 
influence – i.e. a corrupt doctor may affect the moral compass of trainees.  
 
2.6 
 
2.6.1 Rational Choice  
 
In the 1980s in the USA and Great Britain, in particular, this view of people as rational 
secured much political support. With rising crime rates and recessions, social/bio-
psychological approaches and those that fall under the umbrella of “right realism” focused on 
the causes of crime as lying within individual rather than the social structure. The notion of 
individual responsibility was therefore embedded as a central tenant of a range of political and 
policy approaches associated with a conservative view of personal responsibility, behaviour 
and accountability with the criminal law defined by the state as non-problematic, focusing 
predominantly on street crime.39 For these authors, human behaviour, particularly acts of 
violence by young men, included three elements: constitutional factors, the presence and/or 
absence of reinforcement, and the nature of conscience. The majority of crime was committed 
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by young urban males and it was the constitutional and social origins of maleness and 
youthfulness, and the biological status of young people and factors such as sex, age, 
intelligence, body type, and personality that explained criminal behaviour, together with 
permissiveness and dependency on welfare benefits. This approach is not solely rooted in 
explaining crime from a biological point of view, it simply accepts that such above factors are 
“facts” rather than the direct causes of acts, particularly of criminal acts. They suggest, 
however, that these “facts” can account for a predisposition towards crime. This approach 
proposes that the individual learns how to behave in the social world based on what type of 
behaviour is rewarded and under what circumstances, and that our conscience is an 
internalized set of attitudes, mainly formed in childhood, which prevent us from being 
tempted to commit crimes. This approach, however, focuses on specific type of crimes such 
as visible street crime and associates criminal disposition with the poorest sections of society, 
and therefore frames crime as embedded in human nature (or that of the poorest) rather than 
the social fabric. As such, it sees offenders as “beyond reform” and in need of punitive 
control. It thus portrays crime as a very simple phenomenon which can be dealt with using 
simple solutions. 
As part of this view of people as rational actors, Cohen and Felson40 suggest that 
crime is routine (for some people) and that crime is the product of three factors that combine 
in time and place: a motivated offender, a potential victim, and the absence of a capable 
guardian. It is important to note that this approach offers suggestions about the probability of 
criminal behaviour rather than making definite claims about when crime will occur. The 
presence of a motivated offender, a suitable target – a victim or item owned by a victim – and 
the lack of a guardian does not mean that a crime is inevitable. Instead, this theoretical 
approach suggests that the likelihood of crime increases or decreases based on the existence 
of these three elements. Much of this is about “lifestyle”; what we do, where we live, who we 
interact with. This is particularly true for the element of victimization. The hallmark of this 
approach is its lack of emphasis on the offender and focus on what are referred to as the target 
and guardian. Routine activity does not seek to explain the motivation for crime (even though 
it states that a motivated offender is also needed), nor does it offer an explanation of the social 
context, which might highlight the combination of these variables or why some guardians are 
more capable than others. Neither does it endeavour to really explain why some individual 
behaviour renders them more susceptible to victimization.41  
All of these theoretical approaches may assist us in understanding why people commit 
acts of fraud and corruption, but seem to include at least three elements. These are: pressure 
on the individual; the opportunity to commit a crime; and the ability rationalize crime. These 
are all part of what is known as the Fraud Triangle.42 All theoretical approaches in this 
chapter, however, are limited and indeed at times contradictory, dependent on a particular 
view of “human nature”. They are, however, useful: as mentioned earlier, a brief scan of 
criminal justice policy illustrates that theoretical approaches affect which laws and techniques 
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are implemented and therefore theoretical approaches are a core element of crime prevention. 
The measurement of fraud, which was once of little interest to sociology and criminology, 
particularly compared to explaining street crimes, is of some use. They both have a history of 
explaining deviance, the breaking of rules and moral codes and also criminal acts. As such, a 
theoretical framework is a useful template on which to place debates on fraud in healthcare, 
but the current context – in which the EU has an ageing population, the rising cost of 
healthcare, immigration, the refugee crisis – contributes to this rise in interest in fraud in 
healthcare. All crimes and interest in them are dependent on structural and changing 
circumstances.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has highlighted the complex problem of how to define acts of fraud and 
corruption, but it has also emphasized the need for a working definition even if this is limited. 
It has also stressed the need to challenge the view that fraud is a public sector matter when 
acts of fraud and corruption are also committed in the private sector. Furthermore, we have 
provided an account of the contribution that criminology can make regarding the 
measurement of crime and fraud, and also its limitations, and put forward a “new” approach 
to developing a framework for measuring fraud. This FLM, as with all attempts to measure 
crimes, is limited, but offers an approach that is useful in combination with other types of 
assessment. Finally, we have illustrated that theoretical frameworks can be useful because 
they have consequences on how we treat, punish and deter offenders. Further research into 
fraud in healthcare is needed, however, and particularly in the field of the social sciences. As 
this chapter has hopefully demonstrated, there is much in the literature that could be used to 
enrich the much needed debate on fraud in healthcare system around the world.  
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